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Abstract
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) enables a client to perform searches over its outsourced encrypted files
while preserving privacy of the files and queries. Dynamic schemes, where files can be added or removed, leak more
information than static schemes. For dynamic schemes, forward privacy requires that a newly added file cannot be
linked to previous searches. We present a new dynamic SSE scheme that achieves forward privacy by replacing
the keys revealed to the server on each search. Our scheme is efficient and parallelizable and outperforms the best
previous schemes providing forward privacy, and achieves competitive performance with dynamic schemes without
forward privacy. We provide a full security proof in the random oracle model. In our experiments on the Wikipedia
archive of about four million pages, the server takes one second to perform a search with 100,000 results.
1 Introduction
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) enables a data owner to outsource private data to an untrusted server, while
selectively retrieving data elements matching a query without revealing either the data contents or the search keywords
to the server. Although asymmetric searchable encryption schemes have been proposed [3, 4], we focus on schemes
providing high efficiency using symmetric encryption.
A naı¨ve solution is to outsource encrypted files to the server, and store locally an inverted index that associates
each keyword to the set of identifiers of files sharing the keyword. The client finds the list of files matching a desired
query, and retrieves those encrypted files from the server. This requires the client to store a large index and perform all
required search and update computations locally. To reduce the client storage and computation, the index is encrypted
and outsourced to the server. To operate on the index, the server requires a token generated by the client using its secret
key. As the tokens are deterministic, the server learns if multiple searches involve the same keyword. This is known
as search pattern leakage [12, 22].
Efficient symmetric searchable encryption schemes [12, 19, 9, 8, 25, 28, 6] achieve optimal asymptotic search cost
O(d), where d is the number of files in the result. However, this is achieved at the cost of leaking the list of files
sharing the keyword. This is known as the access pattern leakage [11].
These leakages can be exploited by the adversarial servers to compromise privacy of the data and queries. Several
recent papers have shown how such leakage can be exploited to learn sensitive information about the queries or file
contents [17, 22, 1, 7, 24, 31]. These attacks demonstrate that the privacy provided by traditional SSE schemes does
not satisfy expectations in practice. On the other hand, data owners want to fully utilize cloud data services, and rest
assured that the privacy of their data (e.g., emails, business data) is preserved.
Stefanov et al. [28] asserted that a secure SSE scheme must satisfy both forward and backward privacy. These two
properties capture common expectations for file addition and deletion, where a user expects that the privacy of newly
added files in the presence of previous queries (forward privacy) and the privacy of deleted files once they are deleted
(backward privacy) should be preserved. No efficient scheme is currently known that provides backward privacy,
and we do not consider that in this paper. Our focus is on achieving forward privacy with an efficient SSE scheme
supporting dynamic updates.
Forward privacy is a strong property that states the server cannot realize whether or not a newly added file contains
any of the keywords used in previous searches. SSE schemes achieving forward privacy make adaptive attacks less
effective [31]. The first scheme supporting forward privacy is given by Stefanov et al. [28]. The search and update
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costs of this scheme are O(d log3 N) and O(r log2 N), respectively, where r is the number of unique keywords in the
file, d is the number of files in the result, and N is the number of all (keyword, file ID) mappings. It requires O(
√
N)
client storage. Bost’s Sophos [6] supports forward privacy by employing trapdoor permutations. Though the search
and update costs are asymptotically optimal (O(d) and O(r), respectively), the client needs to run O(r) asymmetric
cryptographic operations on a file insertion.
Parallelism is an important efficiency factor that is currently supported by some schemes (e.g., [18, 28]). It requires
the encrypted index be organized in a way that server can access the required parts directly. The provider can distribute
the work on available servers to improve the performance [27, 2]. Our scheme supports parallelism by design.
Contributions. Our main contribution is designing the first asymptotically-optimal parallelizable dynamic SSE
scheme that provides forward privacy. Our scheme outperforms the existing schemes providing forward privacy
[28, 6], and is competitive with the most efficient dynamic SSE schemes without forward privacy [19, 18] while
providing stronger security. In particular, our scheme:
– provides forward privacy: On each search, a key is revealed to enable the server operate on the encrypted index.
We “revoke” this key, remove the index entries accessed, and re-insert them encrypted under a fresh key. The server
never holds a valid key after a search, and hence, cannot decrypt any part of the updated index to see if a file added
later contains a keyword used in a previous search.
– is asymptotically optimal: The update cost is O(r) and the search cost is O(d).
– is parallelizable: The server’s index is a dictionary of encrypted (key, value) pairs where the keys are generated as
outputs of a hash function. Each hash function evaluation is independent, that allows the load to be distributed over
p processors to achieve asymptotically optimal search (O(d/p)) and update (O(r/p)) cost.
– is efficient: The server only evaluates O(d) hash functions for a search. For a file insertion, the server only inserts
the O(r) values given inside the token into the index. Unlike Sophos [6], no asymmetric operations are needed.
– is easily convertible to a scheme in the standard model by replacing the hash functions with pseudorandom functions
(Section 7). This increases the search token sizes, while reducing the server load.
Approach overview. The server stores an encrypted index that associates each keyword with a set of file identifiers
representing the files that contain that keyword. The entries associated with a keyword w are encrypted with a key
Kw that depends on both w and the number of times w has been searched for. Kw is derived using a pseudorandom
function from a master key that is stored by the client. So, the client must store the number of times each keyword has
been searched for so far. We do this in a dictionary called SearchCnt. To search for a keyword, the client generates and
reveals the key Kw to enable the server to operate on the appropriate entries in the encrypted index, find the identifiers
of files sharing the keyword, and return the corresponding (encrypted) files.
Incrementing the number of times w has been searched for on each search leads to a new key Kw be generated for w
and invalidates the previous key revealed to the server. This ensures the freshness of Kw on each search. Therefore, if
w appears in a new file being added, the corresponding entry will be encrypted under a fresh key and the server cannot
link it to the previous searches and realize that the new file contains w. This provides the essential forward privacy
property. On the downside, this requires another round of interaction (at the end of search), to encrypt the accessed
index entries with the new key and upload them back to the server. (We ask the server to remove the accessed entries
from the index during a search. The server can keep the deleted entries, but they have already been leaked and contain
no new information.) Note that this does not increase the asymptotic search cost. Besides, we can eliminate the extra
round using piggybacking (as in TWORAM [14]) and upload the current updated entries together with the next search
token. The whole process ensures that no entry of the outsourced index is encrypted under a revealed key. Further, the
revealed keys will never be used again.
Another requirement for forward privacy is that the identifiers of all files containing a keyword cannot be stored
in an easily linkable fashion (e.g., in a set or a file). Otherwise, adding a new file would trivially reveal which of
the previously searched for keywords are contained in this new file. It may further leak information about other files
the new file shares keywords with. This requires the identifiers of all files containing each keyword w to be stored at
random locations in the index that are also determined by Kw.
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(a) The client and server indexes after adding all files. (b) The client and server indexes after searching for w1.
Figure 1: The example scenario with three files and four keywords.
This solution immediately enables parallelism for efficiency. A sequence number is assigned to each file ID among
the set of files containing a given keyword. These sequence numbers are used to generate the addresses at which the
respective encrypted file IDs will be stored. Therefore, given the total number of file IDs, the provider can divide it by
the number of available servers and ask each one to extract a subset of file IDs to be returned. The client again needs
to store the total number of file IDs sharing a keyword in a dictionary named FileCnt (detailed in Section 3).
Our scheme can be extended to support deletion, as discussed in Section 6. This improves efficiency over keeping
deleted files in the index and filtering out deleted responses, but does not provide backward privacy (which remains
an important, but elusive goal). An important consequence of removing the index entries on each deletion is that our
scheme keeps the index up-to-date, and there is no need to do periodic rebuilds to remove the deleted entries and
cleanup the index, as in other schemes [8].
Note that the size of both SearchCnt and FileCnt is O(m) for a total number of m keywords. Hence, it is reasonable
to store both of them even at the client. In our construction, we assume they are stored by the client, and later show
how to outsource them as well (Section 3.3).
Example. We give an example to better illustrate the client and server indexes and how the protocols operate on them.
Assume there are three files and four keywords: f1 contains w1,w3,w4, f2 contains w1,w2, and f3 contains w1,w4.
Let g(w, f , i) denote the masked version of the ID of a file f after the jth search for w, to be stored in DictW. Hence,
g(w1, f1,0), g(w3, f1,0), and g(w4, f1,0) are added into DictW for f1. Figure 1a shows the client and server indexes
when all files are processed.
Now, the client searches for w1. It sends the server the key k1 and the number of files w1 appears in, 3. The server
locates the given number of DictW entries, decrypts the contents, and finds out that f1, f2 and f3 are the target files.
It deletes the accessed entries from DictW and sends the files to the client. The client increments the number of times
w1 is searched for as: SearchCnt[w1]++. Then, it re-encrypts the received pairs with a fresh key generated using the
updated SearchCnt[w1], and sends them back to the server. The server stores them in their new locations in DictW.
The client and server storage after this operation are shown in Figure 1b.
2 Background
This section introduces our notation and provides a formal model for SSE and its security definitions.
2.1 Preliminaries
Notation. We use x←X to show x is sampled uniformly from the set X , |X | to represent the number of elements in
X , and || to show concatenation. λ is the security parameter, and PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time. A
function ν(k) : Z+→ [0,1] is negligible if ∀ positive polynomials p, ∃ constant c such that ∀ k > c, ν(k)< 1/p(k).
File collection. The client owns n files F = { f1, f2, ..., fn}, each with an identifier id( f j). The files are encrypted using
a CPA-secure symmetric encryption scheme, making the encrypted files C = {c1,c2, ...,cn}, where c j = EncK( f j). In
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a dynamic setting, we represent the set of outsourced files at time t as Ft . The set of all m unique keywords in all files
in F is represented as W = {w1,w2, ...,wm}. N is the number of all existing mappings from W to {id( f j)}nj=1.
Interactive protocols. We describe our scheme as a set of interactive protocols demonstrating the interaction between
the client and the server to perform a functionality: (Outclient)(Outserver)← Protocol(Inclient)(Inserver).
Symmetric-key Encryption. A symmetric-key encryption scheme SKE= (Gen,Enc,Dec) consists of three PPT algo-
rithms. Gen takes the security parameter as input and generates a key. Enc receives the key and a message m as input,
and encrypts m to the respective ciphertext c. Dec takes as input a key and a ciphertext c, and retrieves the message m.
SKE is required to be CPA-secure. Refer to Katz and Lindell [20] for formal definitions.
Pseudorandom function (PRF). Let GenPRF(1λ )∈{0,1}λ be a key generation function and G: {0,1}λ×{0,1}l′→{0,1}l
be a family of pseudorandom functions mapping l′-bit strings to l-bit strings. Define Gs(x)=G(s,x). G is a PRF family
if ∀ PPT distinguishers D,∃ a negligible function ν(.) such that: |Pr[s←GenPRF(1λ ) : DGs(.)(1λ ) = 1]−Pr[Dg(.)(1λ ) =
1]| ≤ ν(λ ), where g(.) is a truly random function [13, 20].
Hash function. Members of a hash function family h : K×M→ C are identified by a K ∈ K as h(k, .). A hash
function family is collision resistant if for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function ν(.) such that:
Pr[K←K; (x,x′)←A(h,K) : (x′ 6= x)∧ (h(K,x) = h(K,x′))]≤ ν(λ ).
2.2 Model
We employ a two-party model including a client (data owner) and a server. The client generates an inverted index
mapping each keyword to the set of identifiers of files containing it, encrypts the index, and uploads it along with
the encrypted files to the server. The server stores the encrypted index and files, and responds to the client’s queries.
The server is relied on to provide highly-available and reliable storage, but not with any confidential client data. We
assume a single-client model.
Since the index and files are encrypted, the server does not learn the search keyword or the contents of files.
However, by running client’s queries and commands, some information leaks to the server over the time. We define
the precise leakage of our scheme in Section 2.3.
Adversarial model. We assume an honest-but-curious server and achieve forward privacy in an efficient and paral-
lelizable manner. In fact, since the client knows the response size, our scheme could be adapted to malicious settings
with minimal overhead by adding message authentication codes to entries as proposed by Kurosawa and Ohtaki [21].
For simplicity, we do not consider those extensions here or in our security proofs.
Definition 2.1 A dynamic SSE scheme consists of the following PPT protocols:
• (sk)()← Gen(1λ )(1λ ): The client starts the protocol to generate a secret key sk given the security parameter λ .
• (Ic)(Is,C)← Build(sk,F)(): The client starts this protocol to outsource a collection of files F given the secret
key sk. It generates the index Ic. Also, the server outputs the index Is and the encrypted files C.
• (I′c)(I′s,C′)← Add(sk, f ,Ic)(Is,C): The client starts this protocol to outsource a new file f given the secret key
sk, and her current index Ic. It updates the index to I′c. Similarly, the server takes his current index Is and the
encrypted file collection C as input, and outputs the updated index I′s and the updated file collection C′.
• (I′c,Fw,t)(I′s)← Search(sk,Ic,w)(Is,C): This is a protocol to find and return the encrypted files containing a
keyword w. The client takes as input the secret key sk, her index Ic, and the keyword w. It updates the local
index to I′c and outputs the existing files Fw,t containing w. The server receives his index Is and the encrypted
file collection C, and updates his index to I′s.
The Build and Add protocols are non-interactive: The client prepares the commands and sends them to the server
for execution. But Search is an interactive protocol: The client and server work interactively to perform the compu-
tation on the encrypted indexes. Since we presented the scheme as a set of interactive protocols, there is no visible use
of tokens. However, the client prepares and sends tokens during the execution of Add and Search to the server.
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2.3 Security Definitions
First, we define the leakage functions that are used inside the definitions. An SSE scheme is secure if it reveals
no information, even when dynamic operations are executed. Naveed et al. [23] observed that this level of security
requires the whole outsourced index and files be transferred on each operation. Existing SSE schemes leak some
information for efficiency. Moreover, dynamic operations reveal extra information such as the relation between the
entries on the encrypted index being accessed and the file under operation. In the following definitions, we assume the
client has issued t search queries Q = {q1,q2, ...,qt} up to time t.
Definition 2.2 (Search pattern) A search pattern is a vector, SP, that shows which keyword each query q j corre-
sponds to. SP[ j] = wi means that wi was queried at time j.
Even though we re-key after each search, the search pattern still leaks since the server knows that the newly re-
keyed items correspond to the completed search. The re-keying is used for forward privacy, not for hiding the search
pattern. (The keywords in queries in this definition are encrypted; i.e., the server does not see the real keywords.)
Definition 2.3 (Temporal access pattern) The temporal access pattern of a keyword w at time t is defined as the set
of existing files at time t sharing w: Fw,t = {id( f ) : w ∈ f ∧ f ∈ Ft}.
Definition 2.4 (Access pattern) The access pattern in an SSE scheme is the union of all temporal access patterns of
all keywords searched for so far [12].
Observe that once a search is done for w, the server learns the set of files in which w appears (the temporal access
pattern). Later on, even when one of these files is deleted, the server knows that the file contains this keyword w
(though not necessarily knowing what w actually is), even in the presence of forward and backward privacy. Once
some information is leaked, it cannot be undone.
Definition 2.5 (Forward privacy) An SSE scheme is forward-private if the file insertion leakage is limited toLAdd( f )=
(id( f ), | f |, |{w}w∈ f |) for all new files f being added at any time after running Build.
This definition states that in a forward-private scheme, the server cannot learn anything about a new file f , beyond
its identifier and size and the number of its keywords, after any number of searches for the keywords in f before the
insertion of f [6]. In other words, the server cannot link a new file to an old temporal access pattern if the scheme is
forward-private. In dynamic SSE schemes without forward privacy, the addition leakage would also include the set of
keywords in the file that was searched for in the past: Q∩{w}w∈ f .
Now, we define the information leakage of each protocol.
LBuild shows the information leaked during the build phase:
LBuild(F) = (N,n,(id( f ), | f |) f∈F).
The total number of (keyword, file ID) mappings and the number, identifiers and sizes of all files are leaked.
LAdd shows the leakage during adding a new file f :
LAdd( f ) = (id( f ), | f |, |{w}w∈ f |).
The file ID and size and the number of unique keywords in the file leak. The is minimal as a result of forward
privacy.
LSrch shows the leakage during search for a keyword w:
LSrch(w, t) = {Fw,t ,SP}.
The temporal access pattern and search pattern are leaked.
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Note that in LSrch, Fw,t is required to answer the search query in a communication-efficient way, and is true
for all efficient SSE schemes. The search pattern leaks since the tokens are deterministic, similarly as in all SSE
schemes. Moreover, by obtaining the client’s files at the outset, the server learns the number, identifiers and sizes of all
outsourced files (unless the files are stored in the ORAM). This is true for all schemes that independently encrypt the
files and outsource them to the server. Independent encryption is useful for efficiently decrypting the search results. In
all SSE schemes employing this strategy, implicitly all operations leak the related file identifiers as well. Even schemes
that do not explicitly show file identifier leakage indeed leak identifiers to be able to operate on the file ciphertexts.
Thus, all our leakage is minimal across all known efficient dynamic SSE schemes.
Now, we define the security of our DSSE scheme via ideal-real simulation similar to [28].
Definition 2.6 (Security of SSE scheme) Let DSSE = (Gen,Build,Add,Search) be an SSE scheme. The following
experiments are executed between a stateful adversaryA and a stateful simulator S using the leakage functions LBuild ,
LAdd , and LSrch:
• IdealF,S,Z(λ ). An environment Z sends the client a setup message, the set of files to be outsourced and the
unencrypted index. The client forwards them to the ideal functionality F. The simulator S is given LBuild .
Later, the environment Z asks the client to run an Add or Search protocol by providing the required information.
For Add, it gives a new file f and the set of unique keywords in the file. Search is accompanied with a keyword.
The client prepares and sends the respective command to the ideal functionality F. F gives the corresponding
leakages to S. In return, S sends F either an abort or continue command. F sends the client either ⊥ (abort) or
‘Done’ for Add, or the set of matching file IDs for Search. Z observes the output. Finally, Z outputs a bit b as
the output of experiment.
• RealΠF ,A,Z(λ ). An environment Z sends the client a setup message together with the set of files to be outsourced
and the unencrypted index. The client runs Gen(1λ ) to generate the key K and starts the Build protocol with
the real-world adversary A.
Later on, the environment Z provides the required information and asks the client to start an Add or Search
protocol. For Add, it gives a new file f and the set of unique keywords in the file. Search is accompanied with a
keyword. The client runs the requested protocols with the real-world adversary A. The client outputs either ⊥
(abort) or ‘Done’ for Add, or the set of matching file IDs for Search. Z observes the client’s output. Finally, Z
outputs a bit b as the output of experiment.
We say a DSSE scheme (ΠF ) emulates the ideal functionality F in the semi-honest model if for all PPT real world
adversaryA, there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all polynomial-time environments Z, there exists a negligible
function ν(λ ) on the security parameter λ such that:
|Pr[RealΠF ,A,Z(λ ) = 1]−Pr[IdealF,S,Z(λ ) = 1]| ≤ ν(λ ).
3 Construction
In our construction, as with other symmetric searchable encryption schemes, the server stores an encrypted index that
relates each keyword to the set of identifiers of files sharing the keyword and helps it perform operations requested by
the client. The client stores the number of files containing each keyword and the number of searches per keyword (for
forward privacy). To execute a query, the client prepares and sends a token to help the server do the job.
3.1 Indexes
Our construction uses data structures, divided between the client and server to maintain the encrypted index. This
requires the client and server indexes to be synchronized. While this is not a big problem for our single-client model,
it would be problematic for multi-client settings. Outsourcing the client index solves the problem. We first assume the
client stores the index, and show how to outsource it as well in Section 3.3.
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Server storage consists of a dictionary DictW of size O(N) =O(nm). DictW is “indexed” by keywords, and relates
each keyword to the set of identifiers of files in which the keyword appears. If f is the ith file containing w, id( f ) is
encrypted using the Kw and i, and is stored in DictW at an address depending again on Kw and i. (This is detailed in
Section 3.2, File addition.) Hence, given a key related to w and the number of files containing w, the server finds and
decrypts all intended file IDs, and returns the corresponding encrypted files.
We require the DictW to store the entries sorted based on their addresses. Since the addresses are random-looking
values generated by a hash function, this ensures that entries of each keyword (and as a result, all entries) are stored
in random locations in DictW. As we process the files sequentially to build the DictW (and upload it when all files
are processed), this ensures there is no leakage about the entries of each file (or keyword). Note that this only helps
to conceal information about the files outsourced at the beginning. Later files insertions reveal the number of unique
keywords in the files (discussed in Section 3.2, Leakage), and DictW does not help in this regard.
Client storage includes two dictionaries: FileCnt that stores the number of files containing each keyword (as in
Cash et al. [8]), and SearchCnt that contains the number of times a keyword has been searched for, and is used to
generate fresh encryption keys upon search (for forward privacy). Both FileCnt and SearchCnt are of size O(m) and
are initialized with zeros. Hence, it is reasonable to store them both locally, compared to the O(nm) outsourced index.
3.2 Protocols
Our protocols for setting up the index, adding files, and doing searches are given in Figures 2 and 3, and described
next.
Setup. We generate two random keys: KG for a PRF G and KSKE for a CPA-secure encryption scheme SKE (Gen
protocol in Figure 2). These two keys constitute the only cryptographic information stored at the client.
File addition. To add a new file f , we extract the set of keywords in f and insert a new entry into DictW for each
keyword wi ∈ f . First, FileCnt[wi] is incremented to show that a new file containing wi is inserted (line 7 of protocol
Add). This enables the client to generate consistent tokens later. The new value of FileCnt[wi] also shows the sequence
number of f among the files containing wi. This value is used as an input to the hash functions to compute the address
in DictW where id( f ) will be stored, and to mask its content (lines 8-10 of protocol Add).
The client then encrypts the file, and sends the encrypted file along with the generated set of (key, value) pairs,
WPairs, to the server. The server adds the encrypted file into the collection C and inserts WPairs into DictW. Though
this is an O(r) operation (where r is the number of unique keywords in the file), the server only copies the token data
into its own index.
An important fact about file insertion is that the server does not know any valid (in-use) keyword-related key when
a file in being inserted. Hence, it cannot check if this new file contains any keywords from previous searches.
Building the database. To initialize the database, the client processes each file, f j ∈ F = { f1, f2, ..., fn}, as described
in the Add protocol (but without sending anything to the server), accumulates the results, and uploads the final results
to the server altogether. Hence, we present Build as a set of Add protocols, each processing a file f j ∈ F . This
modularity is useful for presentation, but it is important that the actual building is not done in a way that allows the
server to observe individual file additions; instead, all files are added to the index by the client and uploaded as a
batch. Moreover, the entries of DictW are located according to order of their addresses. This is important for security
as otherwise, the server would learn information about individual files/keywords.
For each file f j ∈ F , we add the encrypted file c j into the collection C (line 3 of protocol Build), compute WPairs j
and accumulate them into WPairsAll (line 4 of protocol Build). Finally, we send WPairsAll and C to the server that
keeps the collection of encrypted files C and stores WPairsAll in DictW.
Search. To search for a keyword w, the client generates the respective key Kw = G(KG,w||SearchCnt[w]) and sends it
to the server along with the number of files containing w: nw = FileCnt[w] (lines 1-2 of protocol Search), in a search
token (Kw,nw). The server computes the addresses of DictW entries to be accessed as h(Kw, i||0) and the respective
values for unmasking the entries as h(Kw, i||1), for 1 ≤ i ≤ nw. Once the file identifiers are found, the server returns
the respective files to the client and deletes1 the referenced DictW entries (lines 3-7).
1The server does not need to actually delete the accessed entries, but they have already been revealed and contain no new information. As a
fresh key is generated for each search, those entries will not be accessed again.
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Let G:{0,1}λ×{0,1}∗→{0,1}∗ be a PRF, SKE=(Gen,Enc,Dec) a CPA-secure private-key
encryption scheme, and h : {0,1}∗→{0,1}λ be hash functions modeled as random oracles,
where λ is the security parameter.
(sk)()← Gen(1λ )(1λ ) :
1: KG← GenPRF(1λ ) . For the PRF.
2: KSKE ← SKE.Gen(1λ )
3: return sk = (KG,KSKE)
(Ic)(Is,C)← Build(sk,F)() :
1: WPairsAll = {}
2: for all f j ∈ F do
3: Run Add to generate c j and WPairs j. . Without uploading the results.
4: C =C∪ c j . Add encrypted files to the collection.
5: WPairsAll = WPairsAll ∪WPairs j
6: Send C and WPairsAll to the server.
7: The server keeps C and stores WPairsAll in DictW.
8: Ic = {SearchCnt,FileCnt} and IS = {DictW}
(I′c)(I′s,C′)← Add(sk, f ,Ic)(Is,C) :
1: WPairs = {}
2: for all wi ∈ f do
3: if FileCnt[wi] is NULL then
4: FileCnt[wi] = 0
5: if SearchCnt[wi] is NULL then
6: SearchCnt[wi] = 0
7: FileCnt[wi]++ . One more file contains wi.
8: Kwi = G(KG,wi||SearchCnt[wi])
9: addrwi = h(Kwi ,FileCnt[wi]||0)
10: valwi = id( f )⊕h(Kwi ,FileCnt[wi]||1)
11: WPairs = WPairs ∪ {(addrwi , valwi )}
12: c← SKE.Enc(KSKE , f )
13: Send c and WPairs to the server.
14: The server adds c into C and WPairs into DictW.
Figure 2: Protocols for Building and Updating the Database
The client receives the files, increments the number of times w is searched for as SearchCnt[w]++, generates a fresh
key K′w = G(KG,w,SearchCnt[w]) (lines 8-10), re-encrypts the file identifiers with this new key, and sends them back
to the server (lines 12-18). These entries are stored at different locations in DictW than the previous ones because their
addresses depend on the new key K′w, which includes SearchCnt[w].
The server receives the entries encrypted under a different key and learns that it is the same set of entries accessed
recently. Though we use different keys for a keyword w on separate searches, our construction does not eliminate
search pattern leakage. However, if a new file f containing w is added after even multiple searches for w, the server
cannot realize that f contains w; satisfying forward privacy. This is because the addresses are pseudo-randomly
generated, and without knowing the key, the server cannot infer anything from them.
Leakage. Searchable encryption schemes face tradeoffs between performance and leakage, and our scheme reveals
some information to the server to enable efficiency and scalability. In Section 4, we provide a formal proof that the
proposed scheme satisfies the forward privacy requirements. We now informally discuss leakages of our construction.
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(I′c,Cwi)(I
′
s)← Search(sk,Ic,w)(Is,C) :
Client:
1: Kw = G(KG,w||SearchCnt[w])
2: Send the token (Kw,cnt = FileCnt[w]) to the server.
Server:
3: Fw = {}
4: for i = 1 to cnt do . No. of files w appears in.
5: id( fi) = DictW[h(Kw, i||0)]⊕ h(Kw, i||1)
6: Fw = Fw∪{id( fi)}
7: Delete DictW[h(Kw, i||0)] . Delete accessed entry.
8: Send all files corresponding to Fw to the client.
Client:
9: Decrypt and consume the received files.
10: SearchCnt[w]++ . Searched for w once more.
11: K′w = G(KG,w||SearchCnt[w]); . A fresh key for w.
12: WPairs = {}
13: for i = 1 to cnt do
14: addrWi = h(K′w, i||0);
15: valWi = h(K′w, i||1)⊕ id( fi)
16: WPairs = WPairs ∪ {(addrWi, valWi)}
17: Upload WPairs to the server.
18: The server adds WPairs into DictW.
Figure 3: Protocol for Search
During the Build protocol, all existing files are processed and encrypted, and the client and server indexes are
generated. By uploading the encrypted files, the server learns the number and sizes of all outsourced files. In addition,
the size of DictW reveals the number of all keyword-file ID mappings. Since the entries of DictW are ordered by
the entries’ addresses (which are outputs of a cryptographic hash function), DictW does not leak anything that can be
used to infer information about individual keyword/file mappings. Thus, this leakage is the minimum required for an
efficient SSE scheme, satisfying the requirements for LBuild in Definition 2.5.
Upon inserting a new file, the file is encrypted, the corresponding set of encrypted DictW entries is generated
and uploaded. In addition to the file size, the server learns the number of unique searchable keywords in the file.
(The server also learns the time of insertion of each new file, but we consider this outside the scope of the searchable
encryption protocol.) In schemes without forward privacy [19, 18, 8, 25], the server learns which previously-searched
keywords appear in this new file. Schemes that store the set of identifiers of files sharing each keyword together [25]
leak information about the common keywords in the files inserted even before any search takes place. Other schemes
supporting forward privacy (including Sophos [6] and Stefanov et al.’s scheme [28]) leak the same information as we
do. The leakage of our scheme when a file is added is minimal among the known SSE schemes, and is limited to LAdd .
A search operation reveals the list of files sharing the keyword under query, which is required for correct responses
in SSE protocols. As the queries of different searches for the same keyword vary, it seems that we prevent search
pattern leakage. However, the server can link two different queries for the same keyword via the DictW entries that
are re-encrypted. Therefore, our search leakage includes the search pattern leakage and the list of intended files, and
is limited to LSearch. This is also minimal for efficient SSE schemes as pointed to by Cash et al. [8].
3.3 Outsourcing the Local Index
In the scheme presented, the client stores two local dictionaries that are used for token generation. They are both of
size O(m), while the server index is of size O(nm). As an example, with 1M keywords, 4-byte integers, and assuming
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the average size of the keywords is 10 bytes, the client index would require 1M × (10 + 4 + 10 + 4) ≈ 28MB storage.
This is manageable for reasonable clients, including any recent smartphone. However, maintaining the client state
requires synchronization between the client and server indexes. This would prevent extensions to support multiple
clients sharing the server. Hence, we want to outsource this small index as well. Then, the client stores only the keys
(a small constant size) for generating the keyword-related keys and encrypting/decrypting files, and no synchronization
is necessary at the client.
There are different ways to eliminate the client index, but it should be done cautiously to avoid compromising
forward privacy. Note that applying the approaches from Kamara et al. [19] and Naveed et al. [25] would not preserve
forward privacy. Since they store the list of file IDs of each keyword in a separate list, they need to access the
corresponding lists on each file insertion to append or add the new file ID. The server learns to which existing lists the
new file ID is added, something we need to conceal for forward privacy.
One way to do this would be to use an ORAM. Outsourcing the client index through the ORAM, similar to Sanjam
et al. [14], is completely consistent with the ORAM definition as it uses only one block per access. This is different
from outsourcing the server index using an ORAM, where an operation needs accessing multiple blocks in most cases,
which leaks at least the number of accessed blocks. Moreover, ORAM is too expensive to store the whole index, but
practical for storing just the SearchCnt and FileCnt.
To search for a keyword w in this setting, the client first reads SearchCnt[w] and FileCnt[w] to prepare and send
the respective token to the server. Then, it increments the search counter and updates the ORAM accordingly. (With
efficient ORAM implementations, the read and update operations can be combined into one ORAM access, as done
by Zahur et al. [30].) Finally, the search is done as already described in our construction. For inserting a new file
f , the client reads the counters FileCnt[wi] of all keywords wi ∈ f through the ORAM (needed for forward privacy),
increments them, and prepares and sends the insertion token to the server who updates its index DictW, and the file
collection, as described. Finally, it stores the updated counters FileCnt[wi] inside the ORAM.
4 Security Analysis
Our goal is to prove that the proposed scheme provides forward privacy, as defined in Section 2.3, using the leakage
functions also defined in that section. We give the proof for the scheme presented in Section 3 assuming the client
keeps the local index for simplicity. It would be straightforward to extend it to cover outsourcing the client index as
well, but not included here.
Theorem 4.1 If SKE is a CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption scheme, G is a pseudorandom function, and h is a
hash function, our dynamic SSE construction in Figures 2 and 3 is secure based on Definition 2.6, in the random
oracle model.
Proof 4.1 To show that the real game is indistinguishable from the ideal game by any PPT distinguisher, we construct
a PPT simulator S who uses the information provided by leakage functions to simulate the client behavior in a way
that is indistinguishable form a real client. S builds simulated versions of both the encrypted server index IS and the
collection of encrypted files C. Since both IS and C are encrypted, even though their actual contents are not known
by the simulator, they can be created as random values chosen from a uniform distribution over the range of the
encryption scheme or the hash functions used. S needs information about the number and sizes of the outsourced files,
the index size, and the effect of later operations; all are provided by the respective leakage functions.
LBuild provides the information required for starting the simulation: the index size N, and the number and sizes of
the outsourced files. The simulator creates and fills a dictionary DictW with N randomly-generated values of proper
sizes. Since the original contents of DictW are outputs of the random oracle, no PPT distinguisher can distinguish
them from the generated random values. All files in the collection C are encrypted. Hence, S simulates them by
encrypting an all-zero strings of size | f j| for each file f j ∈ F. The CPA-security of the encryption scheme guarantees
that no PPT distinguisher can distinguish this behavior.
Simulating the operation tokens (Add,Search) is more complex. The problem is that these operations affect each
other, and S should keep track of these effects and dependencies among the tokens to keep them consistent, based on
information revealed by their respective leakage functions. S keeps a local copy of DictW, and updates it according
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to the information provided by the leakage functions. This local copy is utilized during token generation, and helps
generate consistent tokens. Let us illustrate how S adaptively simulates the encrypted files, indexes, and tokens.
Initialization. The leakage function LBuild(F)=(N,n,(id( f j), | f j|) f j∈F) reveals the number and sizes of the existing
files and the number of keyword to file ID mappings, N. The simulator takes the following steps:
1: K← SKE.Gen(1λ )
2: Generate N pairs (ai,vi) randomly and store them in a dictionary DictW. Both ai and vi are of length l.
3: Simulate encrypted files as {c j← SKE.Enc(K,0| f j |)} f j∈F .
4: Create a dictionary WKeys to store the last key assigned to each keyword. It can be resized if needed.
5: Create another dictionary WOracle to answer the random oracle queries. WOracle can also be resized over the time.
Simulating the insertion token. The simulator uses the information in leakageLAdd( f )= (id( f ), | f |,n f = |{wi}wi∈ f |)
to update her local data structures. S does the followings:
1: for i = 1 to n f do
2: Generate random values ai and vi, each of length l.
3: Add a new pair (id( f )||ai,vi) into DictW.
4: c← SKE.Enc(K,0| f |)
5: Output the insertion token: (id( f ),c,{(ai,vi)}n fi=1).
Note that due to the forward privacy, S does not know which already searched keywords f contains. Therefore,
we do not assign any keyword to this file at this time. If it appears in a later search result, the actual keyword will
be specified by the search leakage. At that point, we will assign the keyword(s) and program WOracle. This is a local
decision that does not affect the server.
Simulating the search token. The leakage LSrch(w, t) = {Fw,t ,SP} specifies the set of IDs of files containing the
keyword searched for, w. The simulator performs as in Figure 4.
Answering random oracle queries. When simulating the operations, S always programs the random oracle matrix
WOracle in a consistent way. WOracle queries take three inputs: the last key Kw assigned to the keyword w, a zero
or one indicating the address or mask value, and the sequence number of the file in Fw,t . WOracle[Kw][0][i] stores the
address of a DictW cell assigned to the ith file ID in Fw,t , and WOracle[Kw][1][i] contains a values used to unmask the
value stored at DictW[WOracle[Kw][0][i]].
Thus, all operations performed by the simulator are polynomial-time operations. Together with the fact that there
will be polynomially-many adversary queries at most, it makes the total running time of our simulator polynomial.
Besides, the adversary cannot distinguish the outputs of our simulator from those of a real client unless he breaks
encryption or distinguishes the PRF output from random.
5 Experiments
This section reports on our results from experiments on datasets up to the full Wikipedia archive. Our scheme out-
performs the best previous SSE scheme with forward privacy, and has performance that is comparable with the best
existing schemes that do not provide forward privacy.
5.1 Experimental Design
The experiments are designed to evaluate the performance of our scheme under load. We outsource data sets scaling
up to the full Wikipedia archive (nearly 4M pages), and perform different search and update operations.
Implementation. We implemented a prototype of our scheme using C/C++ with the Crypto++ library for crypto-
graphic operations. Our protocols employ only cryptographic hash functions that are instantiated with 20 byte outputs.
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1: nw = |Fw,t | . The number of files returned.
2: if WKeys[w] is NULL then . First search for w.
3: WKeys[w]←{0,1}λ
4: Kw =WKeys[w]
5: for i = 1 to nw do
6: if WOracle[Kw][0][i] is NULL then
7: if fi is added after the build phase then . I.e., there are pairs (id( fi)||ai,vi) in DictW.
8: Select an unused (id( fi)||ai,vi) pair.
9: else
10: Select randomly an unused (ai,vi) pair.
11: WOracle[Kw][0][i] = ai
12: WOracle[Kw][1][i] = vi⊕ id( fi)
13: else
14: ai =WOracle[Kw][0][i]
15: vi =WOracle[Kw][1][i]⊕ id( fi)
16: Remove the pair (ai,vi) or (id( fi)||ai,vi) from DictW.
17: NewPairs = {} . Generate the new pairs to be added into DictW.
18: Kneww ←{0,1}λ
19: WKeys[w] = Kneww
20: for i = 1 to nw do
21: Add a new pair (ai,vi) into DictW, where ai and vi are both random values of length l.
22: NewPairs = NewPairs∪{(ai,vi)}
23: WOracle[Kneww ][0][i] = ai
24: WOracle[Kneww ][1][i] = vi⊕ id( fi)
25: Output the token as (Kw,nw,NewPairs).
Figure 4: Simulating the search token.
Our dictionaries are implemented as C++ maps, which are represented internally as red-black trees. A C++ map
stores the pairs sorted, regardless of their initial order. This is very important for our implementation of DictW, so that
the initial dictionary leaks no information through the tree structure. Further, all information about the initial files are
stored in DictW and outsourced altogether. This means that the server cannot realize how many keywords does each
file contain, or how many files does each keyword appear in; though it learns these information gradually through the
searches. However, as the later files are added one-by-one, the server observes the set of corresponding entries per file
inserted into DictW.
Note that we do not need to store the whole address space for the (keyword, file ID) mappings (e.g., in an array).
We store only the existing mappings. So, we can have a large address space with a small dictionary. Therefore,
collisions may occur, but the actual probabilities are negligible. Let N be upper bounded by 240, and we use a hash
function with 160-bit outputs. Thus, the address space is 2160 and we need to store at most 240 entries. According to the
birthday paradox, the probability of a collision is N
2
2∗|address space| =
280
2161 = 2
−81. This makes the collision probability
vanishingly low, and no collisions were encountered during our experiments.
Nevertheless, it is easy to handle collisions in our scheme. If a collision occurs during the Build phase, we can
simply increment the SearchCnt value for a keyword that causes a collision, and re-generate its corresponding entries
in DictW before outsourcing. The client cannot detect collisions that occur when adding a new file, however, we would
need to rely on the server reporting such collisions to the client, would could then increment the SearchCnt value.
Network configuration. Our prototype is a client/server implementation and all client-server communications go
over the network, as they would in a real deployment. Our experiments are done on Amazon EC2 using m4.4xlarge
instances (64GB of memory, 16 CPU cores) running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS for both the server and client. To evaluate
the costs of our scheme, we perform search operations once on a single core and once on five cores. The multi-core
version is referred to as the parallelized scheme, and the other as the single-threaded scheme.
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Table 1: Statistical information about our experiments.
#Files #Words DictW entries
100,000 808,293 11,534,529
250,000 1,568,036 29,389,776
500,000 2,664,633 62,543,206
750,000 3,419,374 94,328,341
1,000,000 4,104,976 116,065,612
1,500,000 5,390,162 178,084,747
2,000,000 6,435,546 232,594,077
2,500,000 7,401,246 285,650,444
3,000,000 8,300,018 341,258,052
3,835,792 9,801,551 447,070,889
Dataset. We use the Wikipedia archive (12/1/2016) with 3,835,792 files (each corresponding to a Wikipedia article)
as our test dataset. We repeat the experiments varying the number of files up to the full dataset, leading to different
numbers of keyword to file ID) mappings. Table 1 summarizes the experiments, giving the number of files, the number
of unique keywords in all files, and the number of DictW entries.
We select all words with lengths between 4 and 10 from all files. The keyword length has no effect on the search
cost as they are all processed similarly. We use the Porter stemming algorithm [26] to reduce the keywords to a
common form. All keywords, even the mistyped and misspelled ones, are preserved for searchability. The file sizes
do not affect the search cost; they affect the insertion cost since the bigger files are expected to have more keywords.
Comparisons. We focus our experimental comparisons on Sophos [6], which is the most efficient previous dynamic
SSE scheme supporting forward privacy. The Sophos client and server are run on the same two EC2 instances as our
scheme, and they communicate through grpc.
We do not include detailed performance comparisons with Blind Storage [25] and Kamara et al.’s scheme [19],
since neither of those schemes support forward privacy. We do include rough comparisons based on reported perfor-
mance numbers, and our results appear to be competitive or even better than these schemes (although without being
able to test implementation on the same dataset and experimental setup, such comparisons should be interpreted cau-
tiously). We do not have access to an implementation of Stefanov et al.’s scheme [28], another SSE scheme supporting
forward privacy. This scheme uses an ORAM-based structure with O(logN) levels to store and access the keyword
to file ID mappings. It performs and update operations with O(d log3 N) and O(r log2 N) cost, respectively, compared
to our scheme’s costs of O(d/p) and O(r/p). In both cases, we observe a polylogarithmic improvement over this
scheme. Moreover, Stefanov et al.’s scheme requires a rebuild after N operations that retrieves the whole index (of
size O(N)). Our scheme does not need rebuild operations and asymptotically outperforms Stefanov et al.’s scheme
substantially, so it was not necessary to conduct performance experiments to compare them.
5.2 Pre-Computation
The client pre-computation time for both Sophos [6] and our scheme is depicted in Figure 5. The numbers are averages
from 3 runs. Except where noted, reported values in the rest of this section are based on the experiment with the full
Wikipedia archive of 3.8M files and 447M (keyword, file ID) pairs.
There are three pre-computation steps: (1) generating the dictionary and plain index, (2) encrypting the files, and
(3) building the encrypted index. The first step is orthogonal to our work and the second step is done similarly by all
schemes. Therefore, we focus on the cost of building the encrypted index which differs across SSE schemes.
Over the range of file sizes (Table 1), the average pre-computation time per entry in our scheme is between 30 and
40µs. This is ∼60% of the cost for Sophos, whose values were between 60 and 70µs in our experiments. This pre-
computation only needs to be done once, but has considerable cost. For the full 3.8M files experiment (with 3,835,792
files), it took 5h27m with our scheme compared to 8h48m for Sophos. This is due to the higher cost of the asymmetric
cryptography used for Sophos’ trapdoor, compared with the inexpensive hash functions used by our scheme.
13
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Number of files ×106
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Ti
m
e 
(s)
×104 Pre-computation time
Our scheme
Sophos
Figure 5: The client pre-computation (setup) time.
Our per entry pre-computation time is comparable to that reported for Kamara et al.’s scheme [19]: 35µs per entry
for up to 1.5M total entries. Our per entry time is larger than that for Blind Storage, which starts with 4.13µs for 5M
total entries and reaches 1.58µs for 20M total entries, since it stores the set of identifiers of files containing a keyword
sequentially inside an index file and accesses them altogether. (This is why they cannot have direct file insertion while
supporting forward privacy. If two or more files share a keyword, they all need to update the same index file, and the
server realizes this fact.)
5.3 Search
The client generates a search token that includes the keyword-related key and the number of files in which the keyword
appears, and sends it to the server. Token generation is a constant-time operation that does not depend on the number
of files or keywords. It takes ∼10µs in our experiments.
Upon receipt of the token, the server finds and returns all existing files matching the token. Figure 6a shows the
search times of queries with different result sizes, on the full 3.8M file dataset. The average per entry search time is
∼10µs in our single-threaded scheme. Hence, our scheme can perform a search query matching 100,000 files in about
one second.
Employing more cores reduces the search time. With five cores running search in parallel, our per entry search time
drops to less than 3µs. As a specific example, using two and three cores the per entry search time with 479,077 files
in the result reduces from 9.8µs to 6.6µs and 5.2µs. Figure 6b illustrates how the per entry search time is affected by
the number of utilized cores. This shows that our scheme has a very good potential for parallelism (both theoretically
and) in practice.
The per-entry search time in Sophos for the same data and queries and in the same settings is ∼15µs. Despite
the fact that Sophos utilizes full multi-threading to parallelize the computations and other optimizations, its per entry
search time is slower than our scheme running on a single core. Compared to our parallelized scheme, Sophos’s
per-entry search time is roughly five times that of our scheme.
Our scheme is also competitive with the best known schemes that do not provide forward privacy. The reported
per-entry search time in Kamara et al.’s scheme is 7.3µs. The main source of difference in times is that our scheme
needs two hash function evaluations while theirs needs only one. However, their time is more than double the latency
of our parallelized scheme. Their scheme is linear in nature and processes the search results one after another, so could
not easily take advantage of multiple cores. Blind Storage stores identifiers of all files satisfying each keyword in an
index file. Its per entry search time is ∼5µs, which is half the time required by our single-threaded scheme, but higher
than is possible with our scheme using multiple cores.
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Figure 6: Search times.
5.4 Insertion
To insert a file, the client extracts the keywords in the given file, encrypts the file, prepares and encrypts the new set of
(keyword, file ID) pairs, and transfers the results to the server. The server stores the encrypted file and only adds the
pairs to its indexes. This asymmetry in client and server processing times has already pointed to by Kamara et al. [19].
Our file insertion results are in line with what was reported by Kamara et al. [19], but a direct comparison is not
possible as they use the file (collection) size, while we use the number of unique keywords in the file.
As in the pre-computation phase, processing a (keyword, file ID) pair takes∼40µs for the client. Processing a new
file with 4133 unique keywords, for example, takes 157 ms for the client and 12 ms for the server, in our experiments.
Adding the same file takes 302 ms for the client in Sophos.
Compared to Blind Storage, our scheme still appears to provide better performance. Adding a new file with 2267
unique keywords takes 140 ms in Blind Storage, while a similar operation (adding a file with 2192 unique keywords)
takes 81 ms in our experiments.
6 Supporting Deletion
Our scheme can be easily extended to support deletion. The Delete protocol is defined formally as:
• (I′c)(I′s,C′)← Delete(sk, id( f ),Ic)(Is,C): The client uses this protocol to delete a file id( f ), given the secret
key sk and her current index Ic. It updates the index to I′c. Similarly, the server takes the index Is and file
collection C as input, and outputs their updated versions I′s and C′.
Since DictW is constructed around keywords, to delete a file f , the server should examine all DictW entries to
find all occurrences of id( f ). Hence, we use another dictionary DictF on the server as in Kamara et al. [19] that is
indexed by file IDs and stores the addresses of DictW entries storing keywords of each file. Now, the server can touch
directly the related DictW entries through DictF on each file deletion. This makes updating the DictW on each deletion,
efficient. Since DictW and DictF store the same set of information (in different formats), both have the same size N.
Similarly, the client needs the number of unique keywords per file to generate consistent deletion tokens. We use
another dictionary named WordCnt for this.
One important thing is how to link together the corresponding entries from DictW and DictF. Since a search
operation removes some DictW entries, re-encrypts and re-inserts their values into some different entries, the address
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(I′c)(I′s,C′)← Delete(sk, id( f ),Ic)(Is,C) :
Client:
1: K f = G(KG, id( f )) . The file-related key.
2: Send the server (id( f ),K f ,cnt = WordCnt[id( f )]).
Server:
3: C =C\c . Delete the file.
4: for i = 1 to cnt do . No. of keywords in the file.
5: addri = h(K f , i)
6: Delete DictW[DictF[addri]] . Delete the DictW entry DictF[addri] points to.
7: Delete DictF[addFi] . Delete ith DictF entry.
Figure 7: Protocol for Deletion
of those entries stored in the corresponding DictF entries should be updated accordingly. As the contents of DictW
entries are encrypted, updating them with the same encryption keys leads to two-time-pad attacks. On the other
hand, re-encrypting the data with new encryption information requires storing client-side information per file ID per
keyword. To solve this problem, we store only the address part of DictW (and DictF) contents in clear. This will reveal
nothing more beyond the link between the corresponding DictW and DictF entries. (One can even think of a single
table whose entries store contents of the two linked entries together.) Moreover, this will not affect our simulation
during the proof.
To delete a file f , the server needs a key related to f and the number of keywords it contains. The client provides
them inside a deletion token (K f =G(KG, id( f )), n f = WordCnt[id( f )]). The server computes h(K f , i) for 1≤ i≤ n f ,
to find the addresses of DictF entries related to f . Each entry points to a DictW entry. The server locates and removes
the respective entries from both DictF and DictW, excluding them from later search results. However, the “location”
of the removed DictW entries still belong to the respective keywords. A search operation following the deletion
finds such an entry empty and learns that the respective file has already been deleted. Since this search operation
removes all DictW entries belonging to the keyword under query, and re-inserts only the valid ones, the subsequent
search operations will not see the deleted DictW entries, unless other deletion operations affecting the result come
in between. This is an important property of our construction that frees unused memory and does not require heavy
rebuild operations, making it very efficient and practical. The related WordCnt entry in the client local index is also
removed during deletion. Note that deletion does not update FileCnt. It should be updated during subsequent search
operations. The deletion protocol is given in Figure 72.
Leakage. The server only learns id( f ) and the number of unique keywords in f . At this time, it cannot link the file to
its keywords. However, when a keyword containing the deleted file is searched for (since the deleted DictW cells still
belong to the respective keywords), the server realizes that the deleted file contains this keyword. More importantly,
the server can learn if some of the already deleted files share the keyword under query, or if a number of deleted files
share a keyword searched for in the past; similar to existing works [19, 8, 25]. Backward privacy targets limiting these
leakage; we leave backward privacy as future work.
Performance. As in search, the client generates and sends the server a deletion token that includes the file-related
key and the number of keywords it contains. Token generation is a constant-time operation and does not depend on the
number of keywords in the file. The server removes all related pairs matching the token from DictF and DictW, and the
related file itself. Figure 8 shows the server times for performing a deletion for both parallelized and non-parallelized
schemes, as the number of unique keywords in the file varies (as an indication of the file size). The average per entry
deletion time of our non-parallelized scheme is∼17µs in our experiments. This falls down to∼4µs in our parallelized
scheme, and shows 4X improvement. Deletion is a very fast operation for both the client and server. As an example,
deleting a file with 10,460 keywords takes 35ms in our parallelized scheme and 147ms in our non-parallelized scheme.
Sophos does not support deletion directly. Blind Storage also does not provide direct deletion since they store only
2Note that the Build, Add, and Search protocols should also be modified to link DictW and DictF entires together.
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Figure 8: File deletion time by the server.
the inverted index (i.e., all Fw,t sets). They use the lazy deletion strategy, i.e., the file indexes will not be updated until
the next search operation, and do not report deletion times.
Our deletion performance is comparable to that of Kamara et al.’s scheme. Though they measure the deletion time
based on file (collection) size, the main factor affecting the performance is the number of unique keywords in the file.
Deleting a large file (e.g., with 10,000 unique keywords) takes ∼140ms in our experiments, and Kamara et al. report
deletion times up to 130ms for similar scenarios.
Effect on asymptotics. Our scheme, Cash et al.’s scheme [8], Blind Storage [25], and Sophos [6] are all asymp-
totically optimal up to deletions. In Cash et al.’s scheme [8] and Sophos [6], the search cost is additionally affected by
all file deletions affecting the queried keyword since the beginning (nad). In our scheme and Blind Storage [25], while
deletions on the searched keyword affect search performance as well, this effect is neutralized after each search. Thus,
our additional cost is related only to the deletions on the searched keyword since the last search on that keyword (nd).
Obviously, nad ≥ nd . Hence, we achieve even better asymptotic performance, with parallelism and forward privacy.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss other properties of our scheme.
Eliminating Random Oracle Assumption. Our construction is ready to be deployed in the standard model with small
modifications: The hash function is replaced by a proper PRF. Then, instead of sending the key and asking the server
to compute all respective hash values for search and deletion operations, the client computes and sends all PRF outputs
to the server, similar to file addition. The server, given the required PRF outputs, decrypts the requested cells and acts
according to the requested operation. Our construction in the standard model inherits and preserves all properties of
the random oracle model counterpart. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most efficient SSE construction in the
standard model with forward privacy.
Another important advantage of this construction is that the server is not expected to even evaluate hash functions
anymore. It only XORs the received values with those in the specified cells to extract the identifiers of files that
constitute the answer. This means the server is no longer performing even simple cryptographic operations, and
renders our scheme to be deployable in almost all existing cloud environments.
Regarding efficiency, the client’s computation and token size for search is increased from O(1) to O(d). The server
computation is still O(d), without any hash function evaluations. File insertion continues working in the same manner,
i.e., with O(r) client and server computation, and communication. If supported, deletion asymtotics will be increased
to O(r), similar to search.
Parallelism.. Our scheme is ready to benefit from parallelism. It evaluates O(d) and O(r) hash functions for search
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Figure 9: The portal serves all clients.
and update, respectively. Each hash function evaluation is independent, and takes the respective key k and a sequence
number s as input: h(k,s). Therefore, hash function evaluations can all be done in parallel. This allows the service
provider to distribute the load on p available processors, achieving O(d/p) and O(r/p) search and update costs,
respectively. The most efficient known schemes support search with O(d) [19, 6] or O((d logn)/p) [18] cost and
update with O(r) [19, 6] or O((m logn)/p) [18] cost. Further replication, distribution, and load balancing mechanisms
can be employed to improve performance and data availability [29, 27, 2].
Batch update.. Our scheme in its current state supports batch update (i.e., file insertion). In contrast to the schemes
that store index data in a ‘sequential’ way [19, 25, 28, 6], our scheme stores index data, even for the same file or
keyword, in random locations. Therefore, the client can send the updates corresponding to a number of files, without
any order, and ask the server to add them all into the index. This also helps to reduce the leakage of adding files
one-by-one, since the server does not learn how many keywords each file contains.
Organizational portal.. When the number of (keyword, file ID) mappings increases, our scheme requires a larger
storage at the client side (if it is not outsourced). In an organization outsourcing a huge number of files, it is not
reasonable to replicate the same set of local information over all the clients. Using a portal server solves the problem.
It is a local (and hence a trusted) entity that stores the same information as a regular client, and serves all clients of the
organization. The portal receives the clients’ requests, prepares them according to the scheme in use, and sends the
resultant command to the server. On receipt the server’s answer, relays it to the respective client. In addition, using
the local buffer on the portal improve performance of the whole scheme. This is shown in Figure 9.
8 Related Work
Several different schemes have been proposed with the general goal of enabling data to be outsourced, while providing
some kind of search functionality to data clients. Here, we review those most relevant to our work.
Oblivious RAM. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [15] supports access to an outsourced memory while hiding the access
pattern. Different variants of ORAM have been used to minimize the SSE leakages [16, 28, 5, 14]. However, it does
not prevent the access pattern leakage [23] since the server needs to learn the list of files to retrieve. To avoid search
pattern leakage and provide forward privacy, as in Stefanov et al.’s design [28], the server cost scales sublinearly with
the total number of (keyword, file ID) mappings (N), not just size of the result (d).
Static schemes. When the outsourced data is intended only for archiving, no update mechanisms are needed. The
constructions proposed by Chang and Mitzenmacher [10] support static outsourcing with O(n) search time. Curtmola
et al. [12] defined CKA2-security for SSE, and proposed adaptively and non-adaptively secure schemes under this
definition, with optimal search time, linear in the size of the response. Chase and Kamara [11] gave constructions
operating on matrices, labeled data, and graphs. Cash et al. [9] support Boolean search.
Dynamic schemes. A dynamic SSE scheme provides operations to update encrypted data. Update operations leak
more information about the outsourced data. For instance, adding a new file containing a keyword w after searching
for w, reveals to the server that this new file also contains w [10, 28]. Table 2 summarizes dynamic SSE schemes.
Kamara et al. [19] extended the construction of Curtmola et al. [12] to provide a dynamic SSE scheme. They
gave a security definition that is adaptively secure against chosen-keyword attacks (CKA2), and presented the first
dynamic CKA2-secure construction with optimal search time.
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Table 2: A comparison of dynamic SSE schemes.
Scheme Client storage Server storage Search cost Update cost Parallelism Forward privacy
Kamara et al. [19] O(1) O(N) O(d) O(r) × ×
Parallel SSE [18] O(1) O(mn) O((d logn)/p) O((m logn)/p) X ×
Blind storage [25] O(1) O(N) O((d+nd)/p) O(r/p) X ×
Cash et al. [8] O(m) O(N) O((d+nad)/p) O(r/p) X ×
Practical SSE [28] O(
√
N) O(N) O(d log3 N) O(r log2 N) × X
Sophos [6] O(m) O(N) O(d+nad) O(r) × X
Ours O(m+n) O(N) O((d+nd)/p) O(r/p) X X
n and m denote the total number of files and keywords, respectively. d is the number of files containing a keyword, and r is the number of unique
keywords in a file. The number of processors and (keyword, file ID) mappings is p and N, respectively. nad and nd show the number of times a keyword
has been affected by file deletions since beginning and since the last search for the same keyword, respectively (nad ≥ nd ).
Kamara and Papamanthou [18] used a red-black tree over a (static) dictionary for building a parallel and dynamic
SSE scheme. With p processors running in parallel, it achieves O((d logn)/p) search and O((m logn)/p) update cost.
Naveed et al. [25] proposed a dynamic SSE scheme using Blind Storage. It encrypts and stores the set of file IDs
containing each keyword in a separate index file outsourced through the Blind Storage. While they achieve asymptotic
performance and the scheme can be parallelized, they do not offer forward privacy. Indeed, if two files having a
common keyword is added, this fact leaks to the server in their scheme.
Cash et al. [8] proposed interesting dynamic SSE schemes with asymptotic optimal parallel cost (up to deletions).
They extended their static schemes to support file insertion and deletion. After outsourcing the initial data in a static
scheme, they use a dynamic scheme (similar to ours) to support later file insertions. The scheme does not support
forward privacy. They also store the relation between the deleted files and their corresponding keywords to filter out
the deleted files from the search results. This information increases over the time and requires periodic rebuilds to
cleanup the indexes.
Forward-private schemes The dynamic SSE scheme given by Stefanov et al. [28] achieves forward privacy. But,
the ORAM-based structure requires the server to checks all levels on each search, leading to the search cost O(d log3 N)
and update cost O(r log2 N).
Sophos [6] supports forward privacy using trapdoor permutation chains. It puts the encrypted file IDs of each
keyword in a separate chain. The cost of search and file insertion is as ours asymptotically, but the client and server
are expected to run asymmetric cryptography operations. Also, the chain requires sequential scan that prohibits paral-
lelism. To support deletion, they employ another instance of their scheme to keep the list of deleted files and require
the sever to operate on both list on each search to filter out the deleted files.
9 Conclusion
Ensuring forward privacy is an important step to mitigating attacks on SSE. We propose a dynamic SSE scheme that
provides forward privacy with better performance than any previous scheme and without needing any asymmetric
operations. Our scheme reduces the required server computation, and limits the server role to mostly storage rather
than computation. Hence, our scheme can be employed by a broader range of service providers. Moreover, our design
can be converted into a scheme in the standard model. Our scheme is also completely parallelizable and achieves
asymptotically optimal search and update costs of O(d/p) and O(r/p), respectively, performing competitively with
the most efficient known dynamic SSE schemes that do not provide forward privacy. Although forward privacy is
an essential property, it is not sufficient for thwarting all possible attacks on SSE schemes. In particular, it does not
address other forms of information leakage and our design does not provide backward privacy. Further progress in
these areas is needed before SSE schemes can be used in scenarios where information leakage is unacceptable, but
showing that it is possible to achieve forward privacy with high efficiency is an encouraging step towards that goal.
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